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STUDENT COMMENTS
ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE ACTIVITY: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENTS AND FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
recently filed actions to block certain mergers' and licensing agree-
ments between domestic and foreign firms,' on the grounds that such
agreements violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 4 The first, and the
more important suit in terms of its potential effect on existing inter-
national activities, is against Westinghouse Electric Corporation of the
United States, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd., of Japan.' In this action, the Justice Depart-
ment is challenging agreements between the companies whereby they
exchange technology, including patents and know-how, and, in return,
agree not to market certain products in each other's country.' The
agreements between the two companies involve some twenty-two
products and associated equipment including elevators, refrigerators,
air-conditioners, television sets, semi-conductors and power turbines.'
The government alleges that the effect of these agreements has
been to: (I) prevent and eliminate the competition, of the Japanese
1 See complaint, United States v. The Gillette Co., Civil No. 68-141-W (D. Mass.,
filed Feb. 14, 1968).
2 See complaint, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. C 70-852-SAW
(N.D. Calif., filed April 22, 1970).
5 Other antitrust actions recently initiated include the Federal Trade Commission's
challenge of Litton Industries, which last year acquired Triumph-Adler, a German manu-
facturer of typewriters, and the Justice Department's suit against Colgate, Armour,
American Home Products and the British concern of Fisons Ltd. The Litton suit rests
on the theory that the acquisition of one typewriter manufacturer by another will
reduce competition in that line. But Litton argues that its acquisition of Triumph-Adler
will give it the strength it needs to compete effectively against International Business
Machines Corp. (IBM). The latter suit charges that the agreement whereby Fisons Ltd.
licenses Colgate to sell a certain product only for human use and the other two com-
panies to sell it only for animal use is restraining competition. See Wall Street Journal,
July 30, 1970, at 1, cot 6.
4 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 provides that Congress shall have power ". . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. . . ." It was under this
authorization that Congress, in 1890, enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1-7 (1964) which provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade, or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal...." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Under the same
authority, Congress, in 1914, enacted the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1964) which
provides, in part, that no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, another corporation also engaged in commerce "where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
5 See complaint, supra note 2.
's Id. at 7.
7 Id. at 6.
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firms, and to lessen competition in the sale of products to purchasers
located in the United States; (2) eliminate Westinghouse as a com-
petitor in, and to lessen competition in, the export of products from the
United States to Japan; and (3) deprive the public of the benefits of
free and open competition.8
As an example of these effects, the government cites the period
from January, 1966 to March, 1967 wherein Mitsubishi Electric
received a number of specific bid inquiries for the sale of electrical
equipment to the United States, including projects for the Sacramento
Municipal Utility District, the California Department of Water
Resources, the Turlock & Modesto Irrigation District (California),
and the Bureau of Reclamation, United States Department of the
Interior. It is alleged that in each instance Westinghouse, after inquiry
from Mitsubishi Electric, refused to allow Mitsubishi Electric to bid
on the projects" On the basis of these effects, the government alleges
that the agreements constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade and
commerce between the United States and Japan, and are, therefore,
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."
In the second suit, the government is seeking to block Gillette
Company's acquisition of Braun Aktiengesellschaft" (Braun), alleg-
edly the third largest European producer and seller of electric razors.'
In this suit, the government claims that the effect of the acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act." The crux of the
complaint is that Braun will be eliminated as a potential substantial
independent entity in the domestic shaving industry." The suit against
Gillette is significant because it marks the first time that the Justice
Department has challenged in court a U.S. company's acquisition of a
foreign concern."
This comment will examine the general question of the applicability
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to United States technical assistance
agreements with, and direct acquisitions of, foreign corporations. Spe-
cifically, the article will discuss the jurisdictional problems that may
arise, the validity of the typical defense that the challenged territorial
restrictions are ancillary to the primary purpose of the agreement, the
characteristics of potential competition, and the possible judicial
8 Id. at 9, 10.
9 Id. at 9.
10
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
11 See complaint, supra note 1.
12 Id. at 4.
la 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
14 See complaint, supra note 1, at 6, 7.
15 In United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Calif.
190), the government challenged the legality of Schlitz's acquisition of a Canadian
corporation. However, since the Canadian corporation was the owner of a domestic
competitor of Schlitz, the court treated the case as if it were simply the acquisition of
a domestic competitor.
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remedies available, Finally, it will be demonstrated that where territo-
rial restrictions are a major incident in an agreement between two
firms, the test of legality is not whether the restrictions are ancillary
to the main objectives of the agreement, but rather, whether the
parties are engaged in substantial mutual competition.'
I. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Any investigation of the applicability of the antitrust laws to
agreements between domestic and foreign parties must examine the
contention that some of the activities involved may have taken place
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States, and thus are
beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is necessary then, as
a prelude to an examination of the agreements themselves, to explore
the jurisdictional problems that might arise.
Generally, obtaining personal jurisdiction over corporations in-
volved in substantial international activity presents no problem. By
definition, all domestic corporations can be found somewhere in the
United States. With respect to the jurisdiction of the courts over the
foreign party to the transaction, Section 12 of the Clayton Act pro-
vides that "[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district
whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be
found or transacts business. . . .""
The extent to which the courts are willing to go in interpreting
"may be found or transacts business" is indicated in United States v.
Scophony Corp. of America." In this case, Scophony Ltd., a British
corporation with its principal place of business in London, and no
permanent office in the United States, had entered into a series of
allegedly illegal contractual arrangements with various American
corporations. Notice was served in New York on a director of the
corporation who held a comprehensive power of attorney to protect
Scophony's interests in the United States. The Supreme Court held
that the mere administration and surveillance of corporate agreements
was "transacting business" within the meaning of Section 12 of the
Clayton Act."
Since most major agreements between domestic and foreign firms
require at least some surveillance and protection of interests in the
United States by a representative of the foreign party, it appears that
personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation will rarely present
a problem. Mere there is no such representative, it is highly unlikely
10 For an excellent discussion of the antitrust aspects of international business see
Donovan, Antitrust Considerations in the Organization and Operation of American
Business Abroad, 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L, Rev. 239 (1968).
17 15 U.S.C.	 22 (1964).
19 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
19 Id. at 814-18.
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that the agreement is of sufficient importance to justify an antitrust
action.
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, there has been a
plethora of scholarly discussion." It can be seen that certain problems
may arise when attempting to apply the antitrust laws to activity
taking place outside of the United States. The problem is particularly,
acute in the situation where the challenged activity is legal in the
country of its making. In America Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,21
Mr. Justice Holmes remarked: "But the general and almost universal
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." 22
In this case, the American Banana Company, a competitor of United
Fruit, charged that United had "instigated"" the government of Costa
Rica to seize the plaintiff's banana plantation and transportation
facilities, and, by outbidding, had driven all other purchasers out of
the market—all of this allegedly in furtherance of developing a
monopoly. In dismissing the complaint, the Court no doubt was im-
pressed by the fact that it was the government of Costa Rica that
actually seized the plantation. In commenting on this aspect of the
case, the Court said, "it is a contradiction in terms to say that within
its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring
about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable and
proper."" As for the acts of the defendant itself in outbidding com-
petitors, the Court again looked at the legality of the act in Costa
Rica, saying that "it is enough to say that we have no ground for
supposing that it was unlawful in the countries where the purchases
were made!'"
The American Banana case, of course, told only one side of the
story. It addressed its inquiry only to the activities and their effects
in the foreign country. By dismissing the complaint rather than reach-
ing a decision on the merits, the Court was implying that where there
is no allegation that U.S. foreign or interstate commerce is affected,
the Court has no jurisdiction to decide the case.
. Two years later the Supreme Court decided United States v.
American Tobacco Co.," the first in a series of cases" to consider
20
 See K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad (1958). W. Fugate,
Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (1958); Donovan, Antitrust Considerations
in the Organization and Operation of American Business Abroad, supra note 16; Bloch,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Sherman Act Cases, 54 A.B.A.J. 781
(1968); Note, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the
Reach of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 Vend. L. Rev. 1030 (1967).
21 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
22 Id. at 356.
28 Id. at 354.
24
 Id. at 358.
23 Id. at 359.
26
 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
97 Thomsen V. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268 (1927). For an excellent summary see Bloch, supra note 20.
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the effects of a foreign agreement on U.S. commerce. In American
Tobacco there were numerous firms involved in varied and complex
agreements which the Court found to be in violation of the Sherman
Act. The lower court, however, had dismissed the complaint as to
Imperial, a British corporation, . which as a part of a contract with
American Tobacco had agreed to limit its business to the United
Kingdom. The reasons given by the lower court for dismissing the
complaint were that the contract was made in Britain and was valid
under the laws of that country. The Supreme Court, however, held
that "the assailed combination . . . including the foreign corporations
in so far as by the contracts made by them they became cooperators
in the combination—comes within the prohibitions of the . . . Anti-
trust Act. . . MEI (Emphasis added.)
The expansion of jurisdiction in antitrust cases culminated in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America," where Judge Learned
Hand stated: "On the other hand, it is settled law . . . that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends. . . ."8° This case involved agreements
whereby a foreign corporation organized by foreign companies fixed
quotas on aluminum production for its shareholders and fixed a price
each year at which it would buy any part of a shareholder's quota
which it had not sold. The agreement further provided that no share-
holder was to buy, borrow, fabricate, or sell aluminum produced by
anyone not a shareholder, except with the consent of the board of
governors. The court held that the agreements would have been unlaw-
ful if made within the United States, and hence were unlawful even
though made abroad if they were intended to and did affect imports.
The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws (1955) relied heavily on the language of the
Aluminum case and set forth the following guidelines:
[T] he Sherman Act applies only to those arrangements be-
tween Americans alone, or in concert with foreign firms,
which have such substantial anticompetitive effects on this
country's trade or commerce . . . as to constitute unreasonable
restraints . . . .
[C] onspiracies between foreign competitors alone should
come within the Sherman Act only where they are intended
to, and actually do, result in substantial anticompetitive
effects on our foreign commerce. (Emphasis added.) 81
29 221 U.S, at 184.
29 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
80 Id. at 443.
81 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws at 76 (1955).
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The language in the cases discussed above seems to have merged
two issues—the question of jurisdiction of the court over matters
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States, and the issue
of the reach of the Sherman Act's provisions. To the extent that the
Sherman Act prohibits every contract or combination in restraint of
trade, apparently without regard to the country wherein the contract
or combination takes place, the act itself merges the issues. NeVerthe-
less, implicit in these cases is the principle that the court has juris-
diction to review any acts involving foreign parties, occurring within or
outside the country, which have substantial effects in the United
States.' Whether or not the court invokes this power will, of course,
depend upon the existence of a law governing the particular activity
in question.
If the principle is a general one, and not dependent upon the
the particular law being applied, then the test of "substantial effects
in the United States" should also apply to the Clayton Act. In fact,
the statute itself sets forth this test by focusing its application on the
"effect" of an acquisition on competition in any section of the country. 88
Whether the potential effects of eliminating a potential competitor,
such as Braun in the Gillette case, are sufficient to justify jurisdiction
in the case of a foreign acquisition will be discussed below.
II. TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS ACCOMPANYING THE EXCHANGE OF
KNOW-HOW: THE ANCILLARY DOCTRINE
There appears to be no doubt today that an agreement between
competing firms to restrict the marketing of products in their respective
territories, standing alone, is a clear violation of the Sherman Act."
However, the more significant question is whether the same result
can be reached and justified by resort to an arrangement commonly
known as a technical assistance agreement. While a standard legal
definition for such an agreement is lacking, for the purposes of this
comment, it will be defined as a grant or exchange of know-how be-
tween competing firms. Know-how has been defined as:
[i'jnventions, processes, formulae, or designs which are either
unpatented or unpatentable; it may be evidenced by some
form of physical matter, such as blue-prints, specifications,
or drawings; . . . and it may involve accumulated technical
experience and skills which can best, or perhaps only, be
communicated through the medium of personal services."
82 Accord, Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 18, 30 (1965).
33 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
84 See United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
85 Creed & Bangs, "Know-How" Licensing and Capital Gains, 4 Patent Trade and
Copyright Journal of Research and Education 93 (1960).
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The simplest example of the use of the technical assistance agree-
ment to restrain competition is the situation where the recipient of
the know-how is prohibited, as a condition of receiving such assistance,
from marketing the resulting products in the market territory of the
grantor. In most instances, there is a mutual exchange of such know-
how and a corresponding mutual market restriction.
In defending the legality of such an agreement, the parties usually
assert that know-how is a property right, and that historically the
courts have held that territorial restrictions could be exacted in a
grant of property rights." Although scholars have debated the legal
status of know-how for many years," from an antitrust standpoint the
resolution of this question is of little importance. The Sherman Act
states: "Every contract . . . in restraint of trade . . . is . . . illegal."
(Emphasis added.)° 8
 This language has been construed as applying
only to "unreasonable" restraints of competition." Thus, the question
is not whether know-how is a property right, but rather, whether the
contract or arrangement unreasonably restrains competition.
Some early cases expressed the view that the grant or sale of
property or secret processes would justify an agreement not to com-
pete. The doctrine has come to be known as the ancillary doctrine." In
the latter part of the 1940's and early 1950's, several cases" were
decided, which, according to one writer, constituted an attack on the
ancillary doctrine." Another commentator has concluded that although
the cases evidence some hostility toward the ancillary doctrine, they
Bo The territorial restriction has its origins in the classical ancillary restraints rule
under which a man could buy a business and with it obtain a covenant from the seller
not to compete in the same area for a given period of time. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng.
Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711) upheld an agreement by a baker not to compete for five years with
the person to whom he sold his bakery business. Eventually, this was expanded to permit
transfer of a trade-name with the sale of the business. See Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88
(1889). It also became the basis for licensing the manufacture of a product under a
particular process and restricting its sale under a licensed name to a specified territory.
See Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1886), The basic transaction was
the transfer, in whole or in part, of a business or a capital asset—in short, property. See
McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices
and Refusals to Deal, 37 ABA Antitrust L.J. 137, 138 (1967); see also Brewster, supra
note 20, at 161.
87
 Nash, The Concept of "Property" in Know-how as a Growing Area of Industrial
Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 Patent Trade-Mark and Copyright Journal of Re-
search & Education 289, 290 (1962).
88
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
80 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (19I1); Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
40 See supra note 36.
41
 United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
195I); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J.
1949); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
42 Macdonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 351,
365 (1964).
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do not prohibit reasonable territorial limitations in know-how licens-
ing." Both writers agree, however, that the ultimate factual issue in
determining the validity of the agreement is whether the know-how is
sufficiently valuable to balance the loss of competition resulting from
the territorial restrictions." The test was stated as follows: "The sole
touchstone of legality, thus, is an analysis of the technical data granted
and used. If this technology is substantial, valuable and secret, the
restraint should be upheld as ancillary to it; if not, the restraint falls
for lack of ancillarity." 49
It is submitted that the cases relied upon by both commentators
lead to the conclusion that the value of know-how is relevant only
when the firms involved in the exchange are not in competition. This,
of course, is tantamount to saying that the ancillary doctrine is not
relevant in cases involving alleged violations of the antitrust laws. The
genesis of the confusion that arises from these cases is the courts'
penchant for discussing at length the role and characteristics of know-
how. It is easy to interpret this apparent concern as an indication that
the courts consider the nature of the know-how a determinative factor
in the case. A closer examination of the opinions, however, reveals
that in each case the courts ultimately look to the existence or non-
existence of competition between the parties as the controlling factor.
United States v. National Lead Co." involved a combination and
conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign commerce with respect
to titanium pigments. A National Lead subsidiary entered into an
agreement with a Norwegian patent holding company, which, in addi-
tion to cross-licensing titanium patents, also provided for a division
of territories, an exchange of technology and know-how, a restriction
of imports on a territorial basis, and a provision that each party would
be the sole agent in the other's territory for all products in the licensed
field. The court concluded that this combination clearly affected the
interstate and foreign commerce of the United States. 47 The defendants
contended that their conduct was reasonable and produced evidence
that during the period of the agreement the art of titanium production
had advanced, production had increased and prices had sharply de-
clined." The court expressed doubt as to the causal relationships in-
volved and stated that "in the long run, competition is a more effective
prod to production and a more trustworthy regulator of prices than
even an enlightened combination." 49
In response to the defendant's claim that the territorial allocation
43 Barton, Limitations on Territory, Field of Use, Quantity and Price in Know-How
Agreement with Foreign Companies, 28 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 195 (1966).
44 Id. at 203; Macdonald, supra note 42, at 374.
45 Macdonald, supra note 42, at 374.
46 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. • 319 (1947).
47 Id. at 522.
48 Id. at 525.
40 Id.
460
ANTITRUST AND INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE ACTIVITY
was justified as ancillary to the grant of a license under a patent,
the court acknowledged the existence of the ancillary doctrine for
patents, but stated that this agreement went far beyond the doctrine
since it applied to patents not yet issued and to inventions not yet
conceived." In summary, the court said:
Whether the form of association they created be called a
cartel, an international cartel, a patent pool, or a technical
and commercial cooperation, is of little significance. It is a
combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade; and the re-
straint is unreasonable. . . . No citation of authority is any
longer necessary to support the proposition that a combination
of competitors, which by agreement divides the world into
exclusive trade areas and suppresses all competition among
the members of the combination, offends the Sherman Act."
Shortly after rendering its decision in National Lead, the same
district court decided United States v. General Electric Co. 62 The latter
case involved an international arrangement in tungsten carbide be-
tween General Electric (GE) and a German industrial corporation,
Fried, Krupp Aktiengesellschaft. Krupp, as owner of the principal
patents for the production and processing of tungsten carbide, ex-
ported this material to the United States, and licensed its production
to a number of American firms. GE, which held some U.S. patents on
processes for manufacturing a similar hard metal composition, entered
into an agreement with Krupp whereby Krupp licensed to GE all of
its present and future U.S. patent rights in the hard metal field. GE
was obligated to fix the price at which tungsten carbide was to be sold,
to grant a reasonable number of licenses to U.S. firms, and to pay
Krupp royalties on all such metal sold. Krupp, in return, agreed to
refrain from manufacture in the United States and GE agreed not to
export out of the United States or Canada.
The defendants argued that the agreement was nothing more than
a cross-licensing of basic patents with an ancillary, territorial restric-
tion. The court, assuming that such restrictions might be permissible
in some cases," concluded that the contract "was not really a cross-
license at all, but more a naked division of markets among two former
competitors,"" and thus in blatant violation of the Sherman Act.
United States v. General Electric Co., 55 likewise involved, inter
alia, the question of territorial limitations in foreign licensing of pat-
5° Id. at 524.
51 Id. at 523.
52 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
58 Id. at 1009. (The court was referring to the situation where there is only one
original patent and all the others are improvements thereon.)
84 Id. at 1009.
55 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
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eats and technical information. The government charged that GE
was restraining trade through a series of license agreements which
. .. provide almost uniformly for (a) an exchange of patent
rights relating to the manufacture of lamps; (b) an exchange
of information relating to the manufacture of lamps; (c) an
allocation of territory by which (1) the manufacture, sale,
and sale for use in the United States of lamps . . . are exclu-
sively reserved to International General Electric, (2) the
home market of the other party is exclusively reserved to it,
and (3) certain other territory is made non-exclusive and in
which both parties may manufacture and sell."
In addition, a further agreement, called the "Phoebus" agreement,
provided that various subsidiaries of GE and other foreign manu-
facturers agreed to exchange technical information in return for prom-
ises to limit their participation in foreign lamp markets to a fixed
percentage of each other's sales." This agreement was reinforced by
license contracts of technical information to foreign licensees which
restricted the licenses to defined territories."
The court summarized GE's defense as follows:
General Electric argued that territorial restraints in its
licenses were reasonable and therefore valid as ancillary to
an exchange of manufacturing information. In support of its
argument it contended that the exchange of technical and .
manufacturing information and "know-how" was a primary
purpose of the license agreements and was clearly evidenced
by its substance and importance. It referred to the mass of
accumulated industrial information which it had compiled
and argued that the "protection of one's labor is afforded even
though the subject matter may not be strictly a 'trade secret'.
It may stand 'like a trade secret' ". It claimed that the parties
to the license agreements sought technical and manufacturing
information and "know-how" and sought access to each others
research laboratories and that the material involved was of
the utmost importance. It insisted that the "ancillary re-
straints were not to eliminate or even reduce potential or
actual competition, but were simply to protect the parties
against competition which would only have been of their own
creating." In concluding it insisted that the proofs established
that patented inventions and a vast body of "everchanging
manufacturing information and 'know-how' has been ex-
8(1 Id. at 827..
37 Id. at 835.
58 Id. at 837.
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changed between International General Electric and its for-
eign licensees.""
The court did not agree with GE's contentions concerning the relative
importance of the "know-how" to the territorial restriction. Rather, it
found that the primary purpose of the foreign licenses was to restrict
competition in the United States" thus resulting in a violation of the
Sherman Act.
In a similar case, United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,"
the defendant, Timken, a manufacturer of roller bearings, entered into
contracts with several foreign subsidiaries first under patents and, when
these patents expired, under know-how grants. The contracts divided
the world into sales territories and set prices on the licensed products.
The defendant asserted that "any restraints imposed by the contracts
were ancillary to its agreements to furnish know-how . . . [and] that
the law permits the restriction not to compete in each other's territory
as a recompense for its contribution to the foreign companies of advice
and instruction. . . ." 62 In striking down the agreements, the court said
of know-how:
One who possesses greater knowledge or superior skill in the
manufacture of a product is entitled to be fairly and ade-
quately compensated if he furnishes his knowledge or skill to
others. He is not entitled, however, to exact as a price for such
contribution, complete freedom from competition. The quid
pro quo for furnishing of know-how cannot be an absolute
license to avoid the provisions of the Sherman Act. The harm
caused thereby would be too great a tribute to knowledge and
skill when viewed in the light of public policy."
Finally, United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd." also
concerned a vast network of cross-licensing of patents and know-how.
The defendants argued that they had entered into these arrangements
with the purpose of securing for themselves "the 'benefits of an ex-
change of technology."" The court stated that the real issue was
"whether the agreements were entered into with a view to dividing
territories, or to securing the benefit of technology; or, if both motives
were present, whether the unlawful motive was a material considera-
tion."" The defendants justified the agreements on the grounds that
59 Id. at 845.
69 Id. at 847.
61 83 F. Supp. 284 (ND. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
62 Id. at 312.
ea Id. at 313.
64 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
e5 Id. at 527.
06 Id. at 527, 528.
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exclusive license territories were necessary so that they would not be
faced with competition utilizing their own inventions."
The court noted that although this aspect of the agreement might
be supportable, the portion of the agreement prohibiting the licensor
from competing in the territory of the licensee indicated that the
parties sought to protect themselves not against adverse use of tech-
nology, but against competition." Further contributing to the court's
decision was its finding that many of the inventions licensed did not
have any appreciable royalty value, but that they nevertheless were
made the basis of a territorial allocation. "The inference necessarily
follows that the territorial division was the real purpose of the arrange-
ment."°° The court went so far as to place territorial divisions on a
par with price fixing, saying: "There is no intimation in any decision
that elimination of competition is to be given a more favorable judicial
consideration when achieved by the route of territorial division rather
than by way of price fixing. . . .'"°
One common theme appears in all the cases involving territorial
restrictions; the court acknowledges or assumes without inquiry the
existence of the ancillary doctrine. Despite this fact, however, the
court invariably deems the doctrine inapplicable. The commentators
referred to above noted the reasons why the courts failed to uphold
the doctrine and concluded that in the absence of these reasons the
doctrine would have prevailed. For example, language to the effect
that the know-how was not valuable or secret is interpreted as meaning
that if it had been such, the territorial restrictions would have been
upheld.
However, another explanation may be that the courts no longer
recognize the ancillary doctrine, but rather feel compelled to explain it
away because the doctrine seems firmly entrenched in earlier decisions.
This theory is bolstered by analyzing the origins of the doctrine. No
doubt, the common law doctrine that a covenant not to compete in
the sale of a business strongly influenced the formation of the ancillary
doctrine in the licensing field." As one writer has put it: "The analyt-
ical keystone is: 'To what extent may the transfer of unpatented in-
formation be analogized to the sale of a business or the assignment or
license of a patent?' "72
The two cases which appear to have adopted the common law
doctrine can be explained on grounds which throw into doubt their
authority. In United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.," a number
of companies manufacturing iron pipe in different states formed a
67 Id. at 528.
68 Id.
a Id.
70 Id. at 593.
71 See supra note 36.
72 K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad at 161 (1958).
78 85 F. 271. (6th Cir. 1898).
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combination whereby the territory in which they operated was divided
into "reserved" cities and '"pay" territory. The reserved cities were
allotted to particular members of the combination free of competition
from the others, though provision was made for pretended bids by
the latter at prices previously arranged. In the pay territory, all offers
to purchase pipe were submitted to a committee which determined
the price and then awarded the contract to that member of the com-
bination which agreed to pay the largest bonus. The court held that
this was an unlawful combination both at common law and under
the Sherman Act. It was only in dictum that it approved of territorial
restrictions, remarking:
[W ]hen one in business sold property with which the buyer
might set up a rival business, it was certainly reasonable that
the seller should be able to restrain the buyer from doing him
an injury which, but for the sale, the buyer would be unable
to inflict. This was not reducing competition, but was only
securing the seller against an increase of competition of his
own creating."
In Thorns v. Sutherland," two concerns, one domestic and the
other foreign, divided between themselves trade territory in North
America and Europe for the exclusive sale of certain products, and by
the same contract provided for the sale of the business of one concern
to the other in certain countries. The court upheld the territorial re-
striction on the grounds that it was "ancillary . . . and necessary for
the protection of property rights which pass from one to another. . .""
It is submitted that since the primary transaction was the sale of
a business, the court's approval of territorial restraints cannot be
extended to transactions involving only the transfer of technology.
The status of the parties in the suit also gives rise to doubts as to how
far the holding should be extended. It is quite possible that the court
felt that the restraints on competition were far out-weighed by the
undesirability of one party's effort to break a basic agreement by
asserting the illegality of a restraint designed, in part at least, for its
own benefit."
Two post-1950 cases upheld territorial restrictions, and are cited
by some as authority that the ancillary doctrine lives on." In Foundry
Services, Inc. v. Beneflux Corp.," a New York corporation was given
an exclusive license by an English corporation to manufacture prod-
ucts in accordance with secret processes and sell them only in the
74 Id. at 280, 281.
75 52 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir. 1931).
76
 Id, at 593.
77 Brewster, supra note 72, at 162.
78 Barton, supra note 43.
79 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d
Cir. 1953).
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United States and Canada. For its part, Beneflux, the English corpora-
tion, agreed not to sell the same products in the United States for the
life of the agreement. On the ground that Foundry, the domestic
corporation, had violated the agreement by selling a sample worth five
dollars to a Mexican firm, Beneflux organized a subsidiary in the
United States. Foundry Services promptly sued to enjoin Beneflux
from operating in the United States. Beneflux argued that the decisions
in National Lead, the General Electric cases, Timken, and Imperial
had brushed aside "argument based upon old decisions involving
secret processes, patents and trade marks and repeatedly condemned
. . . all divisions of markets between competitors."
The court did not dispute defendant's interpretation of those
cases, but distinguished them on the ground that in each it was found
that the defendants were true competitors. With respect to the case
before it, the court found that "we have no comparable situation
here." 8' The court said that it was inaccurate to say that the English
corporation was a "competitor" of the plaintiff, "which it merely
engaged and authorized to exploit its secret process in North Amer-
ica."b2
 The court went on to describe the contract between the parties
in agency terms:
Actually the plaintiff was no more than the English corpora-
tion's agent or representative here. And common sense and
justice, as well as the "normal" and "usual" business custom
of rational men, dictate that a principal refrain from under-
taking to perform at the same time and in the same place the
precise functions it has engaged a representative to per-
form...."
It would appear that the importance of the decision in Foundry
Services lies not in its acknowledgment of the ancillary doctrine, but
in its limitation of the doctrine to the case of a covenant by an owner-
licensor of a secret process not to compete with its licensee, who, prior
to the grant, was not a competitor. With respect to the former cases
where the parties were competitors, the court said, "it was necessarily
held that those conspiracies were unlawful; and that they were none
the less so merely because of the circumstance that they were effected
through license agreements.""
A similar result was reached in United States v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co." In that case, La Cellophane, a French company, and
DuPont, an American company, entered into an agreement whereby
DuPont was given the exclusive right to manufacture cellophane in
80 Id. at 861.
81 Id.
82 Id.
88 Id.
84 Id.
88
 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), ard on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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North and Central America by processes acquired from La Cello-
phane. The latter agreed not to market or sell cellophane in DuPont's
territory except through DuPont. The district court upheld the
validity of this agreement saying: "Plaintiff's argument [that] a
territorially limited license under a secret process is per se illegal is
not accepted.""
The reasoning behind the decision is very illuminating. The court
noted that when La Cellophane developed a successful process for
the commercial manufacture of cellophane, no one else was making
cellophane. When DuPont learned of cellophane, it was not then
engaged in any business which would cause it to fear the competition
of cellophane. La Cellophane, in turn, had no reason to fear DuPont's
competition, for DuPont had neither the necessary knowledge nor
the technical experience to compete in cellophane.' In short, they
were not competitors. The court characterized the agreement as the
organization of a new enterprise, with La Cellophane contributing
technical assistance and DuPont providing trained management and
capital. "DuPont and the French thus each had a legitimate stake in
the venture . . . and neither party was motivated by anti-competitive
considerations." 88
Taking into consideration all of the cases dealing with the ancil-
lary doctrine, a plausible inference is that the real question is not how
valuable is the know-how, or whether there is an ancillary doctrine;
rather, the question is simply, is competition being unreasonably
restrained. Where the parties to the agreement or combination were
not in competition, territorial restrictions were upheld," not because of
the ancillary doctrine, but because there was no restraint of competi-
tion." Where the parties to the agreement or combination were in
competition, the territorial restrictions were struck down, not because
the know-how was not valuable, but because competition was being
restrained.
88 Id. at 219.
87 M. at 218.
88 Id. at 219.
89 See supra notes 79, 85.
90 For a recent development in this area see the treatment of territorial restrictions
as they appear in the context of manufacturing licences. In United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 3W (1967), Sealy licensed certain firms to manufacture Sealy products and
restricted these firms to selling in specified territories. The licensees were free to make and
sell non-Sealy products without restriction. The government argued that Sealy's licensing
arrangement was a facade for a conspiracy among competitors to divide up the market,
as in Timken. The lower court upheld the territorial restriction but found Sealy guilty
of a price-fixing charge. The government appealed on the territorial question and the
Supreme Court reversed. However, the reason for the reversal was that the Court found
that the territorial restraints were part of the price-fixing conspiracy. In 37 ABA Antitrust
L.J. 137, 142 (1967), Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, suggests that the main significance of Sealy is that the Court refused
to throw out the ancillary restraints doctrine in a capital assets case. He concludes that,
absent price fixing, selling restrictions in manufacturing-type licenses are still "arguably
defensible."
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The underlying problem in all these cases is that the court
recognizes that know-how is valuable, and that if one party confers
it upon another, the granting party should be adequately compensated.
In each case where the price exacted has been a territorial restriction
in markets, the court has gone to great lengths to explain why the
exchange of know-how does not warrant a territorial restriction and
the ensuing loss of competition. It is submitted that the better ap-
proach would be to acknowledge that in many cases the exchange of
know-how is sufficiently valuable to warrant a territorial restriction,
but that the Sherman Act prohibits this particular form of compensa-
tion.
The problem is put into perspective by asking, who should pay
for a grant or exchange of know-how. The obvious answer is the
recipient. However, if an exclusive license to market in a certain
territory is part of the exchange, then it is the public who is ultimately
paying for the transaction, by way of higher prices resulting from a
lessening in competition. Judge Forman, in United States v. General
Electric Co.," touched upon this point when he said:
Reflecting these expressions upon the circumstances of
this case without conceding that the exchange of "know-how"
could be the basis for territorial restrictions, the parties to
the contracts herein are found to have received their quid pro
quo in the mutual exchange of valuable information each to
the other. The interest of the public in the world wide divi-
sions of territory set up and the far flung effects upon com-
petition and trade encompassed in them is very great. No
matter how reasonable the restraints have been considered
as between the contracting parties they were entirely unrea-
sonable in so far as the interest of the public is concerned.
(Emphasis added.) 92
Thus, in setting up contracts or combinations involving the transfer
or exchange of know-how, the parties should ensure that the public
does not ultimately pay for any advantages that might be received by
the companies.
There are several alternative methods of compensation not involv-
ing the public. Where the holder of valuable know-how feels that its
market position is strong enough to withstand increased competition,
it can either sell its know-how on a cash basis or transfer it with an
agreement to receive royalties on all resulting products. This latter
alternative is especially advantageous to the company which for lack
of capital cannot or does not desire to finance any expansion in its
market territories. In such a case, the grantee would have to decide
whether it would be more economical to develop the know-how on its
own, or buy it from the holder. In the case where the grantee is not
al 82	 Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
92 Id. at 847.
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in a position to buy the know-how with cash or royalties, it can offer
the grantor certain know-how that it alone had developed. Such arrange-
ments can produce considerable savings for both grantor and grantee
without expense to the public through loss of competition.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE CLAYTON ACT ON FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS
Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce" as including
trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign nations."
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that no corporation engaged in
commerce shall acquire another corporation also engaged in commerce,
"where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
tend to create a monopoly. )°'
Section 7 was adopted in 1914 to apply specifically to mergers
that the Sherman Act could not reach because a "restraint of trade"
or "monopoly" had not actually occurred. In its original form it applied
only to acquisitions of stock or share capital and was concerned only
with the elimination of competition between the acquiring and the
acquired firm.
In 1950, the Clayton Act was amended to (1) extend the scope
of the law to acquisitions of assets as well as stock, (2) extend the
coverage to include competition in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, and (3) eliminate the test concerning restraint of
commerce in any section or community." The legislative history of
Section 7 reveals nothing as to the intent of Congress regarding the
application of the Clayton Act to foreign acquisitions. However, a
reasonable and common sense interpretation of the statute yields no
reason why it should not be so applied, providing of course that
jurisdictional requirements are met.
Section 7 applies only to "acquisitions by one corporation engaged
in commerce [of] another corporation engaged also in commerce.""
The significant word here is "commerce." Section 1 defines commerce
as including "trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations."" Thus,
an acquisition of a foreign firm would fall within the Act if the foreign
company were engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States,
and if its acquisition might lessen competition "in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country!'"
98 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
9° 15 U.S.C. g 18 (1964).
00 15	 § 18 (1964). See also S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 2 U.S. Code, Cong. & Adm. News 4293 (1950), which states:
The committee wish to make it clear that the [amendment] Is not Intended
to revert to the Sherman Act test. The intent here, as In other parts of the
Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and
well before they have attained such effects as would Justify a Sherman Act
proceeding. Id. at 4296.
90 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
or 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
98 For an excellent discussion of the Clayton Act and its application to foreign
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There appear to be no decisions to date which have squarely
applied Section 7 to a foreign corporation doing business in its own
right in the commerce of the United States." In 1968, however, the
Federal Trade Commission proceeded under Section 7 against Dresser
Industries,'" and its subsidiary, Magnet Cove Barium Corporation,
which had acquired Canadian Industrial Minerals, Ltd. This Canadian
company had substantial barite resources, and two years prior to the
acquisition, Magnet purchased about 80% of the out-put of the Ca-
nadian firm. Dresser contended that the Canadian company was not
engaged in "commerce" as defined by the Clayton Act. The FTC
hearing examiner dismissed the complaint, holding that the acquisition
did not tend to lessen competition. The Commissioner did not adopt
the opinion of the examiner, but dismissed the complaint with a warn-
ing as to future acquisitions in the industry. The significance of the
case lies in the fact that neither the hearing examiner nor the Com-
missioner dismissed the complaint because the Canadian company
was not engaged in commerce under Section 7, or because Section 7
did not apply to foreign acquisitions.'"
The second instance where the government attempted to apply
Section 7 to the acquisition of a foreign company was United States v.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 102 Schlitz, a major brewer, bad acquired
Labatt, a Canadian brewer, which in turn controlled General Brewing,
a domestic competitor of Schlitz. The district court found that al-
though Labatt was not then a substantial competitor in the United
States, it had the "desire, the intention and the resourcefulness to enter
the United States markets and to make General Brewing a stronger
competitor in those markets."'" Thus, it can be seen that the real
focus of Schlitz's interest in acquiring Labatt was the acquisition of
control of a domestic competitor.'" This being the true significance of
the case, the question of whether the acquisition of a purely foreign
concern having no substantial connection with a domestic firm would
violate the Clayton Act, was not settled.
Two distinct questions are raised in the latter case. The first is
whether the elimination of a potential competitor results in a lessening
of competition. The second is whether the fact that the potential com-
petitor is a foreign corporation raises any jurisdictional problems not
settled under the Sherman Act cases. The first of these questions is a
acquisitions, see Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving American
and Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws—Part II, 40 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 38 (1966).
99
 For a possible exception, see United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F.
Supp. 129 (ND. Calif. 1966).
100 Dresser Industries, Inc., 63 F.T.C. 250 (1963).
101 Bridges, Foreign Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 52 A.B.A.J. 360,
363 (1966).
102 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Calif. 1966), add per.suriam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
199 Id. at 147.
194 Id. at 138, 145.
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general question and can be answered without regard to whether
foreign companies are involved or not.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,'" the Supreme Court held that
Procter's acquisition of the assets of Clorox Chemical violated Section
7 of the Clayton Act. In its evaluation of the anticompetitive effects of
this merger, the Court held that (1) the substitution of the powerful
acquiring firm for the smaller, but already dominant, acquired firm
might substantially impair the competitive structure of the industry
by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from
aggressively competing, and (2) that the acquisition eliminated the
potential competition of the acquiring firm. The court condemned the
loss of Procter's potential competition because the market was highly
concentrated, because Procter had been found to be the "most likely
prospective entrant," and because "the number of potential entrants
was not so large that the elimination of one of them would be insignifi-
cant."'"
Similar language is found in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co.,107 where the government attacked the acquisition of a newly
incorporated joint venture by the joint venturers. In finding a violation
of the Clayton Act, the Court said, "The existence of an aggressive,
well-equipped and well-financed corporation engaged in the same or
related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic
market would be a substantial incentive to competition which cannot
be underestimated."'"
There appear, therefore, to be at least two factors that a court
must consider in determining whether the acquisition of a potential com-
petitor will lessen competition: (1) the subjective eagerness of the
potential competitor to enter the market, and (2) the objective
characteristics of the market itself. In United States v. Wilson Sport-
ing Goods Co.,'" the government sought and received a preliminary
injunction against the merger of a sporting goods manufacturer and a
gymnastic equipment manufacturer. The court made a thorough
analysis of the market conditions and noted the relevancy of the
Procter & Gamble and Penn-Olin tests. It felt that the morger would
in effect lessen competition because of the "adverse psychological
effects" it would have on the acquired company's smaller rivals and
upon potential new entrants into the market."
Thus, there is no direct or easy answer to the question of whether
the acquisition of a "potential competitor" necessarily violates the
Clayton Act. The answer to this question is dependent upon the facts
of each case. As the government itself recognized in its brief in Procter
& Gamble:
no 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
106 Id. at 581.
107 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
108 Id. at 174.
no 288 F. Supp. 543 (1968).
110 Id. at 556.
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To find that a merger has one or even both of these ef-
fects [i.e., raising entry barriers and eliminating a potential
competitor] is not necessarily conclusive on the question of
its illegality. Eliminating one of many equally able and willing
potential entrants would not substantially impair the efficacy
of potential competition; nor would raising barriers to entry
imperceptibly. And some competitive advantages that raise
entry barriers seem a dubious predicate of antitrust illegality,
since they reflect the kind of efficiencies—in production, dis-
tribution, and the like—that a pro-competitive policy is
intended to promote. In addition, impairment of potential
competition is likely to be harmless wherever the market is
sufficiently unconcentrated that existing competition can be
relied upon as a market regulator.
These qualifications require that the Commission and
the courts proceed with care in judging a merger which affects
only potential competition."
Assuming that the acquisition of a particular potential competitor
does result in a violation of the Clayton Act, the question still remains
whether the same result obtains if the acquired firm is a foreign corpo-
ration. If the presence of substantial effects in the United States is
sufficient to give jurisdiction to U.S courts in Sherman Act cases, the
same test should apply in Clayton Act cases. The question to be asked
then is whether the acquisition of a foreign potential competitor, sup-
posedly legal in the country of the competitor, causes sufficient sub-
stantial effects in the United States to justify the acquiring of jurisdic-
tion by the courts. Further reduced, the inquiry becomes, can effects
which are merely "potential" ever be "substantial" in terms of juris-
dictional requirements.
Perhaps the inquiry need not proceed so far when at least one of
the corporations is a U.S. citizen. Up to this point the analysis of juris-
dictional considerations has focused on the "place of effects" rule. This
test is set forth in Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law
of Foreign Relations:
§ 18. Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect
Within Territory
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if either
a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of
states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
111 Brief for the Petitioner at 34, FTC v. Procter and Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967),
reprinted in Antitrust Developments 1958-1968: Supplement to Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws at 87 (1955).
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activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within
the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles
of justice generally recognized by states that have rea-
sonably developed legal systems.
However, where the conduct, although in a foreign state, is caused
by a citizen of the state in which the effects occur, Section 30 of the
Restatement takes precedence:
§ 30. Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Nationals
1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a)
attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of
the state wherever the conduct occurs. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, the court has two grounds upon which to base jurisdiction. It can
decide that "potential" effects are "substantial" effects, or it can rely
on the state's inherent power to review the acts of its citizens wherever
the conduct takes place.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF APPROPRIATE RELIEF
After determining that a certain agreement or acquisition violates
the antitrust laws, there arises the important question of sanctions and
remedies. Of the various types of relief available,'" the government
most frequently requests some form of equitable relief.'" This selec-
tion of equitable relief in turn raises the problem of fashioning an
appropriate equitable remedy.'" In the case of an executed technical
assistance agreement involving the transfers of know-how, a decree
that the accompanying territorial restrictions are invalid and that the
parties are free to market in their competitor's territories does not
solve the problem of what to do about the technical information that
has already been transferred. The court cannot enforce an order that
the grantee "forget" what it has learned. Yet, to allow the grantee to
use the information in competition with the grantor, who paid for the
research and development of that knowledge, would unjustly penalize
the grantor. The Westinghousel" complaint is an excellent example of
a case where there is potential harm in merely striking down the
112 According to Brewster, supra note 72, at 226, there are four categories of formal
statutory sanctions: private recovery of treble damages; criminal; forfeiture of property;
and equitable relief.
115 Id. at 228.
114 According to Hollabaugh and Rigler, Scope of Relief in Government Patent and
Know-how Antitrust Cases, 12 Antitrust Bulletin 327 (1967) the various forms of relief
include compulsory licensing with or without royalties, dedication of patents to the
public, a limited injunction against enforcement of the territorial restriction on licensing
arrangements, and dissolution or divestiture.
115 See complaint, United States v. The Gillette Co., Civil No. 68-141-W (D. Mass.
filed Feb. 14, 1968).
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territorial restrictions without some further requirements on the
parties. If the territorial restrictions are removed, Mitsubishi would be
in a position to manufacture Westinghouse-designed products in Japan
with low-wage labor, and sell those products in the United States in
competition with products manufactured in the United States by
American labor. The Supreme Court recognized this danger in Hart-
ford-Empire Co. v. United States,'" and vacated a decree requiring
the grant of a royalty-free license on the ground that the effect of such
a license would be to confiscate considerable portions of the defendant's
property.
An obvious solution is to require the recipient of the know-how
to pay a reasonable royalty. This remedy would, in effect, reform the
contract into one of the alternative proposals discussed above. Thus,
in United States v. National Lead Co.,'" the Court upheld the district
court's decree that defendants grant a non-exclusive license under cer-
tain patents at a reasonable royalty." 8 The Court based its decision on
the theory that since the case was a civil rather than a criminal pro-
ceeding, the purpose of the decree was not punishment, but effective
and fair enforcement."'
The National Lead case formed the basis of the decision in United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.' 20 In that opinion, the
district court said:
We hold that in the circumstances before us, compulsory
royalty free licensing may not be decreed in the absence of
explicit interpretation of existing statutes by higher courts
affirmatively permitting such action. 121
The court distinguished the one case that the government offered as
precedent for the granting of royalty-free licenses,' 22 and referred to
National Lead as having settled the rule requiring reasonable royalties.
Nevertheless, there is language in the National Lead case which
seems to leave open the question of the legality of royalty-free li-
censes. The court stated:
While it has been contended that, because of the decision
of this Court in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, the
District Court was not free in the present case to require the
issuance of royalty-free licenses, we feel that, without reach-
ing the question whether royalty-free licensing or a perpetual
injunction against the enforcement of a patent is permissible
110 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
117 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
778 Id. at 328-35.
110 Id. at 338, 348.
120 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
121 Id. at 225.
122 Id. at 224, 225.
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as a matter of law in any case, the present decree represents
an exercise of sound judicial discretion. (Emphasis added.) 1"
United States v. General Electric Co.' interpreted this language
as casting a shadow on the ruling in Hartford-Empire and inviting the
application of such a measure when and where the circumstances
warranted it. 125 The court then proceeded to decree royalty-free li-
censes on the ground that the profit margins of defendant's com-
petitors were already so slim that any royalties would inhibit their
competing with defendant. It attempted to reconcile this decision with
the Imperial Chemical case by pointing out that the latter was based
on a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, while the present case
was based on violations of both Section 1 and 2 of the Act. 12°
The most recent case to consider the question of royalty-free
licenses, United States v, Singer Manufacturing Co.,127 did little to
clarify the confusion arising out of National Lead. On remand, after a
finding by the Supreme Court that certain licensing agreements con-
cerning sewing machines violated the Sherman Act,'" the district
court was faced with the choice of royalty-free or reasonable royalty
licenses. The lower court acknowledged the persuasiveness of the gov-
ernment's argument for royalty-free licenses but denied such relief
stating that "the Supreme Court has to date refused to approve either
royalty-free licensing or non-enforcement of patents."'" However, the
court concluded its opinion with a statement indicating that royalty-
free licensing would be appropriate if it were necessary.
The test . . . which must guide the Court in framing an
antitrust decree is what measure must be applied in order to
dispel the evil effect of the defendant's wrongful conduct—
which means what will restore competition.'3°
Carried to its logical conclusion, this language indicates that if the
granting of royalty-free licenses is the only way to restore competition,
then such a remedy would be legal. This result can be reconciled with
National Lead by arguing that in such a case, royalty-free licensing
would be, in fact, remedial and not penal.
The 1955 Report of the Attorney General's Committee was also
divided on this particular issue, with the majority following the Hart-
ford-Empire prohibition of royalty-free licensing 13t A well-reasoned
minority report, however, set out three reasons why royalty-free li-
123 332 U.S. at 338.
124 115 F. Supp. 835 (DN.J. 1953).
125 Id. at 843.
120 Id. at 844.
127 231 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
128 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
120 231 F. Supp. at 243.
180 Id. at 244.
181
 Attorney General's Report (1955) at 256-59.
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censes were proper. First, it concluded that neither Hartford-Empire
nor National Lead pronounced a blanket statutory or constitutional
ban on that remedy. Rather, it was the feeling of the committee that
these cases hold merely that a court will decree no more in any one
case than is absolutely needed. Second, the minority argued that
royalty-free licensing is in principle no more "confiscatory" than com-
pulsory licensing at reasonable rates. Finally, it argued that royalty-
free licensing may be the only way, in some cases, to achieve the
desired level of competition, and that, therefore, the courts should
have the power to decree such relief. 182 The logic of the above argu-
ments is difficult to assail, and no doubt the minority report will play
an important role when the Supreme Court finally decides the question.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the government's recent challenges to certain interna-
tional agreements and acquisitions has caused some excitement in the
business world, there is no reason to believe that the international
aspects of such activity will result in any new legal approaches to the
problems raised. The tests for personal and subject matter jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation are relatively well-settled, although one
cannot be completely confident of this matter until the Court rules
on the acquisition of a purely foreign corporation. On the other hand,
there is still considerable, debate over the weight to be given the an-
cillary doctrine in market division cases. Although the courts have
continued to strike down agreements providing for territorial restric-
tions, the defense that the agreement is ancillary to some other objec-
tive continues to be raised. This comment has attempted to show that
there is good reason to believe that, given the proper case, the Court
will ultimately expose the true nature of the doctrine and provide that
"decent burial" eventually given to all legal fictions. The recent
domestic cases holding that the elimination of potential competitors is
illegal portend a similar result for corresponding cases in the inter-
national field. Finally, the legality of compulsory royalty-free licenses,
although still clouded by the language of early Supreme Court cases,
appears to be a distinct possibility in future cases.
These conclusions present problems for both the government and
private interests. On one hand, since many firms are involved in over-
seas acquisitions and licensing agreements, the repercussions of a gov-
ernment victory in the Westinghouse and Gillette cases would be
widespread. Present patterns of international trade would be substan-
tially reshaped as companies divested themselves of foreign acquisi-
tions and cancelled licensing agreements.
On the other hand, a government victory would have certain un-
desirable consequences in the economic sphere of our international
relations. If the government obtains the relief it seeks in these cases,
132 Id.
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there will be a substantial increase in competition from abroad, with
a probable resulting decrease in domestic profits and jobs. Further-
more, it is possible that our country's balance of payments will be
adversely affected.
The Justice Department, however, sees the cases in a different
light. In the opinion of Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Antitrust Division, the objective of the suits is "to
hold the line against further economic concentration in this country."
He denies that foreign ventures have been singled out for enforce-
ment, but adds: "We're trying to keep the door open as widely as
possible to both actual and potential foreign competitors." He says
that this would benefit American consumers by providing new prod-
ucts and lower prices."'
Generally, the Court quite properly has avoided any explicit
consideration of national economic policy or the political factors in-
volved in antitrust actions.'" The function of the judicial process is
not to make political or economic decisions, but rather to interpret
the scope and purposes of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The Court's
basic views remain the same as in those cases discussed above, and
are plainly set forth by the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. United States.
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter
of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social in-
stitutions. But even were that premise open to question, the
policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
And to this end it prohibits "Every contract, combination ..
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States."'
TIMOTHY E. KISH
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 It has been suggested that the antitrust Iaws be amended to direct the enforce-
ment of agencies to entertain application for advance antitrust rulings on proposed
activities in international trade. The agencies would, after giving appropriate considera-
tion to foreign trade, foreign policy and national security, give a prompt ruling which
would be the last word on the matter. The status of other foreign-policy considerations
would be secured through the cooperative efforts of the State Department and other
interested agencies, The Commerce Department would supply the necessary factual
judgment from the standpoint of trade necessity. Scott and Yablonski, Transnational
Mergers and Joint Ventures Affecting American Exports, XIV Antitrust Bull. I, 30-31
(1969).
185 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
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